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ABSTRACT:   
In the paper, the authors2 present legal and bioethical issues related to the fertilization outside the 
human body, particularly, to the producing and applying an artificial womb for this purpose. 
Considering these issues appears to be necessary to create proper legislation that will provide a 
legal basis for the given issue.   
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1. Introduction 
According to the myth, in the evening, Zeus, Hermes and Poseidon found a grange on their way and 
they asked for shelter in there. The poor farmer hosted them and gave them to eat and to drink. To 
thank him for his generosity, the gods revealed their identity and, since he sacrifices his only bull 
for them, they offered him a favour. He told them about the promise to not marry another woman he 
had done to his recently dead wife. But his wish is not to have a new wife, but a child (nec coniunx 
et pater esse volo), so he asked for the birth of a son. The gods took the bull’s hide and urinate into 
it; then they asked the farmer to bury it in his garden and to dig it up nine moths later. The peasant 
did so and in the end, he found a beautiful and strong child wrapped in the leather. He called him 
Urion, ab urina, and later on the name changed to Orion3. 
The growth of an organism in an artificial environment outside the body in which it would normally 
be found is called ectogenesis. This term was coined in 1923 by the British scientist Haldane in his 
Daedalus4. Haldane wrote imagining how a 2070 college student would describe the evolution of 
this technique.  
“It was in 1951 that Dupont and Schwarz produced the first ectogenetic child. […] France 
was the first country to adopt ectogenesis officially, and by 1968 was producing 60,000 
children annually by this method. […]”5. 
Ectogenesis attracts the attention from many scholars. In 1931, Aldous Huxley6 wrote about a 
fictional world in which ectogenesis represents the first step of a eugenic program of social re-
                                                     
1 for correspondence: georgetumanishvili@gmail.com 
2 The paper represents the fruit of joint reflections by the authors. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 have been 
written by George G. Tumanishvili, paragraph 3 by Marco Poli. The conclusions have been written 
by both authors.  
3 P. Ovid Naso, Fasti, trans. George Frazer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), book 5, 
188-259. 
4 J.B.S. Haldane, Daedalus, or Science and the Future, a paper read to the Heretics, Cambridge, 
on Feb. 4th, 1923.  
5 Haldane, Daedalus. 
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organization. In his novel, he describes how, at the Central London Hatchery, artificially 
fertilised ova were placed into incubators where they remain a different amount of time, 
according to the cast he or she belongs to. Children destined to work in chemical factories are 
treated so they can tolerate lead and calcium and “a special mechanism kept [embryonic rocket-
plane engineers’ containers] in constant rotation ‘to improve their sense of balance’7” 
Huxley’s work has left a so deep mark that “the mere mention of it evokes a whole complex of 
hostile attitudes towards science. It has become a kind of byword for a society in which the 
values (or non-values) of scientific technology are dominant, and which has therefore reduced 
man to a species of machine”8.  
Despite many scholars’ essays discussing Medically Assisted Procreation (MAP), only a few 
studies addressed ectogenesis ethical and legal implication. According to Gelfand, “this is both 
surprising and troubling given that it is likely that an artificial womb designed for human use 
will be developed in the near future, and the moral and social implications of ectogenesis are 
complex and far-reaching”9. The impact of ectogenesis on social relationships and values 
imagined in fictional worlds since then is huge. Human life and laws ruling many aspects of it 
would be deeply affected by an effectively performing artificial womb: the opportunity to 
consider a pregnancy in which the human body is not involved would inevitably face those 
cultural, ethical, social and (sometimes) religious framework on which national legislation are 
built on.  
This article is going to focus on ectogenesis implications, both from the embryo and the 
mother/father (Parent(s) point of view. In doing so, a definition and description of the artificial 
womb technology will be provided stressing out the scientific development and the scope of 
ectogenesis. Defined the state of the art, this work will describe two categories of potential 
artificial womb use: ex vivo pregnancies and in utero pregnancies. According to these categories, 
the article analyzes legal implications related to potential sex selection techniques. 
 
2. Artificial womb 
2.a. Artificial womb and its purpose 
Ectogenesis is defined as the “development of a mammalian embryo in an artificial environment”10. 
The artificial environment involved in this technique is the artificial womb, that is the device that 
holds the embryo during the pregnancy. In this period, “the artificial womb would supply nutrients 
and oxygen to an incubated fetus and would be capable of disposing of “waste materials’’. This 
would, therefore, necessitate an artificial placenta for mediating the necessary exchanges between 
fetal circulation and the system that would replace the maternal flow”11. Indeed, an artificial womb 
needs several components in order to achieve its purpose: a “shell” to house the embryo, amniotic 
fluid to surround it and a regulatory system to provide the right amount of oxygen, nutrients and 
hormones. 
Medically speaking, ectogenesis is already partially a reality. Indeed, the period in which the fetus 
has to be inside of the womb to successfully develop is becoming smaller and smaller. Thinking at 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2010.  
7 Huxley, Brave New World, 35. 
8 Peter Firchow, “Science and Coscience in Huxley’s Brave New World”, Contemporary Literature 
16, n. 3 (1975), 301 
9 Scott Gelfald, “Introduction”, in In Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology and the Future of 
Human Reproduction, ed. Scott Gelfand and John R. Shook, (Amsterdam-NY: Rodopi B.V., 2006), 
2. 
10 Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary (3rd ed. 1961). 
11 Carlo Bulletti et al, “The Artificial Womb”, Annals of the New York Academy Science 1221 (2011), 
124. 
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the beginning of the pregnancy, thanks to in vitro fertilization (IVF), conception can occur in the 
laboratory and then the embryo can be kept alive for two of three days before placing it in the 
womb. At the other end, extremely premature babies born before the 25th weeks’ have up to 50% 
probability of survival12. This gap of a little more of five months in which the natural womb is 
essential is likely to be narrowed because of the doctors’ attempts to save premature children. 
Moving from this considerations, res ipsa loquitur: saving premature born babies is the first 
purpose of an artificial womb.  
Freeing pregnancy from a natural uterus, ectogenesis could be regarded as an instrument to 
overcome gender inequalities13: thanks to this technique, women could avoid the biological burden 
of the gestation and all the health, pain and work implication related to the pregnancy (see 3.a).  
Artificial womb could also represent the turning point in the surrogacy debate: “The medical case 
for ectogenesis, then, would consist of the medical case for surrogate motherhood coupled with the 
claim that ectogenesis should be chosen in preference to surrogacy”14. The reason for this 
preference is linked to the “carrier’s” artificial and strictly controlled nature. In this sense, artificial 
womb might be favoured for several reasons: avoiding the risk of women exploitation, reducing 
costs of the procedure (once it becomes a standard one), staying out of any battle over custody. 
For the sake of completeness, we mention another argumentation for ectogenesis, it is that embryos 
could be grown to guarantee tissues to mature humans15. Indeed, using in transplantation fetuses’ 
cells, the risk of immunological rejection is very low. However, even if transplantation of fetal 
tissues has received great worldwide attention during 1980’s and 1990’s16 this artificial womb’s 
implication has to be considered obsolete. The same purpose is now achieved with embryonic stem 
cells. These cells are derived from a pre-implantation blastocyst at 5-7 days post-fertilization and 
they possess qualities such as “pluripotency and a seemingly limitless capacity to proliferate in vitro 
in their undifferentiated state” 17. Embryonic stem cells derived from a not-implanted embryo, 
rather than from a fetus, so artificial womb is not implicated in this process. 
So, freeing human beings from what we have considered biological and factual burdens, 
ectogenesis seems to be the key to a new procreative anthropocentric era, imposing to investigate 
potential self-determination rights’ balances.  
 
2.b. The Historical Perspective 
This is not the first time that the possibility of ectogenesis has received attention. Firstly, in 1920’s, 
the idea of ectogenesis was generated and circulated in intellectual circles, generating little or no 
interest in the average person. This changed in 1970’s and 1980’s when ectogenesis became of 
public interest. Not only the cultural élite, but also a wider public took part in the debate over the 
linkage between sexuality and reproduction. According to Firestone, independently of the level 
reached in political and social equality, nothing would change for women as long as natural 
                                                     
12 Imad T. Jarjour, “Neurodevelopmental Outcome After Extreme Prematurity: A Review of the 
Literature”. Pediatric Neurology 52, n. 2 (2015), 143. 
13 See Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (New York: Bantam Books, 1970). 
14 Peter Singer and Deane Wells, “Ectogenesis.” In Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology and 
the Future of Human Reproduction, edited by Scott Gelfand and John R. Shook (Amsterdam-NY: 
Rodopi B.V., 2006), 11. 
15 Singer, “Ectogenesis”, 15. 
16 M.Terese Verklan, “The ethical use of fetal tissue for transplantation and research”, Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 18, n. 8 (1992), 1172.  
17 Steinhoff, Gustav, ed. Human Embryonic Stem Cell, in Regenerative Medicine: from Protocol to 
Patient. Berlin: Springer International Publishing, 2016 (Springer International Publishing, 2016), 
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reproduction remains rule18. However, not all feminists supported ectogenesis: according to them, 
artificial reproduction was a repudiation of women’s body and women themselves. Specifically, 
O’Brien19 theorized a women’s reproductive consciousness in contrast with a men’s alienated 
reproductive consciousness20: this dissimilarity and the correlated uncertain connection of the man 
with the child are the reason why men are seeking the control women’s reproductive power21.  
In the today debate, the majority of the population thinks that artificial womb is not the instrument 
of a misogynistic plot22. This is due to the certainty that women can have control over the artificial 
reproduction (ectogenesis) as well as over the natural one. Furthermore, compared to previous 
debates, what changed the most in the today-scenario is the science involvement: ectogenesis is 
believed to be more a science fact than a science fiction.  
Recent success in ectogenical research have been already mentioned, but it is not an isolated 
incident: these research teams are not the first, nor the last, scientists to attempt Promethean 
research. In 1944, Dr John Rock made the first successful in vitro fertilization23; then, Dr L.B. 
Shettles24 succeeded in maintaining embryos to the blastocyst stage for 3 days. Attempts to support 
the implantation of human embryos outside of the women body were firstly performed in 1982 in 
Italy by Dr Bulletti and continued in New York City in 198325.  
Referring to the artificial womb’s components, the shell to hold the developing embryo have been 
realized both out of artificial materials and out of human endometrial cells grown on a scaffolding 
shaped like a uterus26. In addition, the amniotic fluid – which serves to protect the embryo from the 
outside injuries, promote musculoskeletal development and maintain a constant temperature, has 
been used in both experiments with animals and humans27. There is also the need for a device 
through which the embryo can receive oxygen, nutrients and hormones. One noticeable example of 
this kind of equipment is the ECMO, an extracorporeal membrane oxygenator that delivers blood 
flow and oxygen to the embryo; it also works as a dialysis machine. In this sense, in Japan, in 1996, 
Dr Kuwabara reported attempts at preserving a developing goat in an artificial womb, provided with 
amniotic fluid and blood supply, for three weeks 28. Then, many attempts have been performed, 
culminating in the 2016 goal in which researchers broke the record for keeping human embryos 
alive in an artificial environment. Researchers in the US and the UK have been able to keep 
embryos alive and active outside of the human body, completely independent of a woman’s 
                                                     
18 Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex. Firestone argued that the joy of giving birth is a mere patrirchal 
myth; childbirth is “like shitting a pumpkin”.  
19 Mary O’Brien, The politics of reproduction (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) 
20 Talking about alienation, O’Brien means that men sense their control over whether human life 
goes on and whether, in particular, their own genetic offspring lives on. 
21 See inter alia Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (New 
York: Norton, 1986); Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: reproductive technologies from artificial 
insemination to artificial wombs (New York: Harper & Row, 1985). 
22 Rosemarie Tong, “Out of Body Gestation: in whose best interest?”, Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb 
Technology and the Future of Human Reproduction, ed. Scott Gelfand and John R. Shook 
(Amsterdam-NY: Rodopi B.V. ed., 2006), 11  
23 Miriam F. Menkin and John Rock, “In vitro fertilization and cleavage of human ovarian eggs”. 
American Journal of Obstetrice and Gynecology 55, n. 3 (1948), 440. 
24 Landrum B. Shettles, “Selection of Biology: Studies on living human ova.” Transaction of the N. 
Y. Academy of Science 17, n. 2 (1954), 99; and Landrum B. Shettles, “The living human ovum.” 
American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 76, n. 2(1958), 365. 
25 Carlo Bulletti et al, “Extracorporeal perfusion of the human uterus”, American Journal of 
Obstetrice and Gynecology 154, n.3 (1986), 683. 
26 See Francesca Dolendo, “Baby Machines: The Birth of the Artificial Womb”, Triple Helix 2, n. 4 
(2006). 
27 Jonathan Knight, “Artificial womb: An Out of Body Experience”. Nature 419 (2002), 106.  
28 Bulletti, “The Artificial womb”. 
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womb.29-30. For the first time, human embryos were grown for 13 days in an artificial womb. Then, 
researchers had to stop the experiment because “for ethical reasons, [scientists] are obliged to stop 
[…] cultures at day 14 of development or before the primitive streak formation”31. 
 
3. Artificial womb legal implications 
The Roman law principle according to which mater semper certa est has always been considered 
the basis for creating the status/relationship of mother and child. Leaving out – for simplicity – the 
adoption case, according to many32 national laws, motherhood is founded on the fact of birth: the 
legal mother is the woman who has given birth to the child. Indeed, legal mother corresponds to the 
biological one; in the case of egg donation, the biological element is not relevant33. Removing the 
woman in labour from the reproductive scenario, ectogenesis will inevitably undermine this 
conception. Following paragraphs will discuss the artificial womb’s legal implication in relation to 
maternal, paternal and embryo interests.  
3.a. Maternal and Paternal Interests   
The artificial womb is considered a medical device aimed to overcome various biological limits 
linked to the reproductive field. Do these limits constitute an injustice? Do the State have the duty 
to actively remove these limits? Does the artificial womb – as a fertility treatment – have to be 
provided in the healthcare system? 
About the distribution of sources, Dworkin34 stressed the importance of a fair equality and the 
central role of justice in health care. In this sense, natural inequalities may generate a prima facie 
right to restitution. Focusing on the fertility ground, Burley tried to answer the question “who 
should bear the cost of fertility treatments?”35. Burley observes, on the one hand, that infertility 
may generate a prima facie right to restitution, so the infertile could seek for compensation; but, on 
the other hand, he noticed that having children could be regarded as being merely an expensive 
                                                     
29 Ian Sample, “Researchers break record for keeping lab-grown human embryos alive”, Guardian 
(2016). 
30 Alessia Deglincerti et al., “Self-organization of the in vitro attached human embryo”, Nature 533 
(2016), 251. 
31 Marta N. Shahbazi et al., “Self-organization of the human embryo in the absence of maternal 
tissues.” Natural Cell Biology 18 (2016), 706. 
32 See CZECH REPUBLIC: according to §775 Obč.Z. a mother is a woman who has given birth to a 
child (“matkou dítěte je žena, která je porodila”). ITALY: Article 267 c.c. maternity is demonstrated 
by proving the identity of the person who is assumed to be the child with the person who was given 
birth by the woman who is alleged to be the mother (“la maternita' e' dimostrata provando la 
identità di colui che si pretende essere figlio e di colui che fu partorito dalla donna, la quale si 
assume essere madre”). FRANCE: Article 310-3 Code civil, filiation is proved by the act of birth of 
the child, by the act of recognition or by a statutory declaration which affirms the status (la filiation 
se prouve par l'acte de naissance de l'enfant, par l'acte de reconnaissance ou par l'acte de notoriété 
constatant la possession d'état).  
33 see e.g. ITALY: Tribunal of Rome, Ordinanza 8th August 2014 and Ord. 22nd April 2015. The two 
couples involved in this case had used homologous fertilization in vitro and were awaiting the 
implantation of the embryos produced. During the operation, the healthcare staff mixed up the test 
tubes and implanted the two embryos in the wrong womb. In its judgment, the Tribunal of Rome 
affirmed that, coherently to what Article 269 CC affirms, gametes’ genetical origin is not relevant to 
determine motherhood: the mother is the woman who have given birth to the child. CZECH 
REPUBLIC: Z. Králíčková, New Family Law in Czech Republic: Back to Traditions and Towards 
Modern Trends, in The International Survey of Family Law, 71, 84 (2014).  
34 R. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, 38 McGill Law Journal 833, 836 (1993) 
35 Justine C. Burley, “The Price of Eggs: Who Should Bear the Cost of Fertility Treatments?” In The 
future of Human Reproduction, ed. John Harris and Søren Holm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 
127 
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taste, so it does not necessarily constitute grounds for compensation. To overcome this impasse, 
quoting Dworking, she stressed that if people’s tastes are involuntary acquired and they are related 
to their conception of the ‘good life’, then restitution is possible but not necessarily warranted. 
Indeed, if individuals “could be offered the means of removing or relieving the desire or taste for X 
in a way that did not encompass the provision of X, but they chose to retain the desire, they would 
not be eligible for compensation”36. Infertile couples who have a strong desire for children don’t 
want to receive treatment aimed at removing the desire: they want the provision of children 
themselves. According to what we said so far, in this case, state funding for fertility is not justified.  
Then, Burley approached the problem from a different angle: people who cannot have children do 
not choose their infertility, nor do they construe childlessness as part of their conception of good 
life. They are victims of cruel fate and, because of that, they may merit compensation. Thus, for 
Burley, since persons’ inability (infertility) to pursue their life goals (having a child) is not the result 
of a voluntary choice, fertility treatments can be fitted into Dworkin’s framework as a form of 
redistributive justice. It has to be noticed that Burley’s argument doesn’t prove anything but a prima 
facie right to restitution. Facing limited State budget, the question of who have the right to have the 
care remains. Dworkin recommend a ‘quasi veil of ignorance’ method in which, “[n]o one would 
be in a position to say, of himself or anyone else, that that person is more or less likely to contract 
sickle-cell anaemia, or diabetes, or to be the victim of violence in the street, than any other 
person”37. In this kind of hypothetical scenario, Burley suggests that, since reproduction central role 
is socially recognized, “[i]t is plausible to insist that individuals in the aggregate would stipulate 
infertility as one handicap they were particularly concerned to receive compensation for”38. 
 
Artificial womb as remedy for gender inequalities 
As we have seen, natural inequalities can be argued to constitute prima facie grounds for restitution. 
Moving from this starting point, Smajdor adds another element. She says that the fact that, unlike 
men, women have to gestate and give birth in order to have a child is a prima facie injustice that 
could be overcome by the development of ectogenesis.  
Applying the ‘veil of ignorance’ method, she tries to imagine which criteria individuals might use 
in their analysis about this topic. First of all, she moves from Burley considerations: the probability 
of having a particular condition is considered a significant factor, as well as some social tendencies 
do, such as the desire for genetical linked descendants. Then she added her own ‘ingredients’.  
Even though Dworkin does not recognise freedom from pain as a good, he assumes that freedom 
from pain is likely to be very important. Indeed, in his analysis, he distinguishes well-being in two 
categories: volitional well-being, that is improved when someone achieve what he/she wants; and 
critical well-being, that is improved when the person achieve what he/she should want, “that is the 
achievements or experiences that it would make his life a worse one not to want”39. In this scenario, 
the freedom from pain and sexual or other frustration would constitute a third category of well-
being, but it can figure within the two named categories. Even if avoiding pain counts in volitional 
interest, it counts as well as part of critical interest.40 Because of that, since gestation and childbirth 
are very likely to be associated with pain and suffering, Smajdor suggest that this factor is likely to 
be considered by people from behind the veil. 
                                                     
36 A. Smajdor, The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis, 16 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare and 
Ethics, 336, 337 (2007) 
37 Dworkin, “Justice in the Distribution of Health Care”, 889. 
38 Burley, “The Price of Eggs”, 142. 
39 Ronald Dworkin, “Foundations of Liberal Equality”,in Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values, ed. Stephen L. Darwall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1995), 230 
40 Dworkin, “Foundations of Liberal Equality”, 230, footnote 33. 
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Moreover, if we consider a ‘behind the veil’ scenario in which people do not know to which gender 
they will belong, people have to be conscious that they have 50% of probability to face those 
problems linked to pregnancy. Still focusing on the criteria to elect for the provision of such a 
compensation, Smajdor highlights that the women’s desire to reproduce as men do - “without 
risking their physical and mental health, economic and social well-being”41 – is recognizable as a 
health-oriented need, rather than an expensive taste. In fact, we have to keep in mind that 15% of all 
pregnant women develop potentially life-threatening complications42. 
Furthermore, even if the “yuck factor” linked to artificial womb would prevail on all the other 
“behind the veil” arguments and someone might argue that problems related to pregnancy are 
recoverable or at least medically manageable and that some women enjoy the experience of being 
pregnant43, Smajdor’s demand for reproductive freedom and self-determination sounds reasonable. 
Supporting this view, Burley’s ‘bungee jumpers metaphor’44 make it clear the difference between 
option luck (non compensable) and brute luck (compensable). Suppose that a person who suffer 
detached retinas and a healthy one go bungee jumping: the first one does not have a claim for 
compensation, because he voluntary underwent under the risk. According to Smajdor, pregnancy is 
the bungee jumping and “there might be greater scope for ectogenesis to be prioritized due in part to 
the pain and trauma that even the best-managed childbirth entails”45 so that women can consciously 
choose to jump or not. 
So far, we analysed the artificial womb’s impact on gender inequalities linked to the pregnancy, 
but, for the sake of intellectual honesty, we have to briefly expose our doubts on the decisiveness of 
this argumentation in the whole cultural landscape. Indeed, even though it seems to be the key for a 
new reproductive gender equality, ectogenesis is not solving the problem of who is entitled to be the 
caregiver after the childbirth. Murphy emphasises that pregnancy prepares women for motherhood 
in some way, suggesting that gestational mothers are the best one to take care of children46. This 
common and questionable47 assumption shows that the cultural problem on the woman’s role still 
exists and, to turning upside down what Firestone said, nothing would change for women as long as 
they are still asked to play the part of ‘angel of the hearth’. 
- One parent case  
Just as some women might wish to be free from the burden of pregnancy indispensability, as the 
same men might wish to do so. Nowadays, in many countries, single women have access to IVF, so 
they can start a one-parent family. In the previous paragraph, the artificial womb impact on women 
reproductive freedom has been analysed, stressing ectogenesis central role in reproductive self-
determination. This paragraph will analyse artificial womb implication from the single-man point of 
view.  
We can imagine a man with a strong desire for biological offspring. He is not biologically meant to 
gestate and give birth, so he will not succeed in passing on his genes unless a woman carries a child 
genetically related to him. Within a fertile straight couple or a lesbian one, the woman involved in 
this scenario is the female partner or wife; for infertile straight couples and (in some lawscapes) 
                                                     
41 Smajdor, “The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis”, 340. 
42 World Health Organization. Managing complications in pregnancy and childbirth, V (Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2003).  
43 See T. Murphy, “Research priorities and future of pregnancies”, Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics, 21 (2011). 
44 Burley, “The Price of Eggs”, 136. 
45 Smajdor, “The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis”, 340-1.  
46 Murphy, “Research priorities and future of pregnancies”. 
47 See A. Mullin, Reconceiving preganancy and childcare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
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same-sex ones (two men), the woman is a surrogate mother. More and more single women are 
starting a single-parent family48.  
Being a single man with a strong desire for paternity could be considered as a deficit in personal 
resources? Applying to this topic Smajdor’s reasoning, the fact that women do not have to be in a 
couple to have a genetically related child, whereas men do, is natural inequality and so it is the 
candidate for redistributive justice. Single men do not choose the inability to gestate themselves and 
the fact of not having a partner; and as we have previously seen, the deficit in personal resources 
which is not the result of a personal choice and that inhibits the person’s capacity to pursue his life 
goals constitutes the basis for compensation. Access to motherhood has been granted to women in a 
relationship, single ones and infertile ones: mainly referring to the last two mentioned categories, 
for the sake of equal treatment, according to men the same treatment appears fair. 
Would the artificial womb for single men succeed the veil-of-ignorance test? Reasonably the 
freedom to be fully developed as a human person, that is, in this case, the freedom to pursue 
paternity goal, can be included within the Dworkin’s freedom from pain and sexual or other 
frustration. Even the Smajdor’s gender-blind behind the veil scenario would reasonably give 
something to think about.  
Nevertheless, the “yuck factor” would play the main role in here. Indeed, if on the one hand, 
biotechnologies are considered an advantage for someone, on the other hand, they are considered as 
dangerous by others: those technologies are alternatively presented as a Pandora’s vase or a 
cornucopia49. The artificial womb for single men, as well as surrogacy for male gay couples, is 
criticized by ecocentrism supporters because it is considered an expression of an anthropocentric 
approach50. Scepticism on ectogenesis as an alternative to natural pregnancy has already been 
stressed in the previous paragraph, and it is even stronger if this technology is referred to single 
men. This approach considerably distances itself from the natural procreative course, and because 
of that, it raises many doubts. For this very reason, even though artificial womb might be 
reasonably considered as an instrument to achieve complete equality, it will not probably pass the 
veil-of-ignorance test. 
  
- Contractual agreement between intentional parents 
Modern cases support the idea that marital and procreative decisions fall within a constitutionally 
protected zone of privacy. Because of the privatization process concerning family law, more and 
more relevance has been given to individuals’ self-determination. For this reason, it is possible to 
imagine a scenario in which genetic mother and father could define their rights over an embryo in 
an artificial womb trough a contract. The aim of a contract is to enforce promises and to protect 
parties’ expectations: this is due to the fact that unplanned factors can complicate even the best-laid 
plan. 
Trying to find it out a possible discipline, it has to be stressed that, in several countries, “protecting 
the unborn” laws are in force with the aim of defending life before birth, which is perceived as 
inviolable51. Protecting these lives is an ordre public matter, so the margin of self-determination 
                                                     
48 Maria Salomon et al., “Setting up a networking platform for single women using donor semen”, 
in Abstracts of the 31st Annual Meeting of the European Society of Human Reproduction and 
Embryology (2015). 
49 This methaphor in Mariachiara Tallachini, “Biotecnologie e diritto”, in Mariachiara Tallachini 
and Fabio Terragni, Le biotecnologie. Aspetti etici, sociali e ambientali, (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), 
104-106. 
50 See Stéphane Bauzon, “Dal Rischio alla Precauzione: il caso delle biotecnologie” in La Persona 
Biogiuridica (Turin: Giappichelli: 2005). 
51 See Diya Uberoi and Maria de Bruyn, “Human rights versus legal control over women's 
reproductive self-determination”, Health and Human Rights 15, n. 1 (2013). 
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accorded to future parents depends on the space that ordre public itself has left to private choice. 
Indeed, if a contract is illegal on grounds of public policy, it is void ab initio and it is 
unenforceable52. 
It seems reasonable that the rules governing those contracts will be those used by IVF clinics, rather 
than the one used for surrogacy. This is due to the great differences between ectogenesis and 
surrogacy: firstly, the latter involves a third party carrier; secondly, surrogacy contracts 
enforceability is centred around the right of the surrogate mother in not being forced to sever her 
rights to the children.  
Regarding the content of the contract between future parents, it would probably concern the end of 
the artificial pregnancy. In this sense, there are two possible contracts: one affirming that the 
pregnancy has to continue until the end under any circumstances; and the other authorizing 
termination. This second contract leads to the problem of identifying who can end the gestation: 
potentially the parties might opt for a mutual consent model or for a unilateral termination one.  
Artificial womb contracts allowing unilateral termination are likely to be unenforced because they 
“represent a more extreme version of contracts concerning frozen embryos, which are still often 
declared unenforceable”53.  
The mutual consent type of contract is meant to allow the termination of pregnancy when both 
parties mutually consent to discontinue the pregnancy. In such a scenario, if both parties agree on 
the termination, regarding the enforcement, the only aspect of determining is the lawfulness or not 
of the action. If only one person wants to discontinue the pregnancy, probably courts would apply 
                                                                                                                                                                             
National Assembly, Constitution of the REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR. Article 45 (2008). Available at: 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08. html; M. Szabó, “Constitutional 
reforms in HUNGARY, 2011-12” (presentation at The 12th Conference of the Asian Ombudsman 




BUoass3PfAa44TePB8DAQ; M. Cosgrove, “MEXICO high court allows state anti-abortion 
amendment,” Jurist Legal News & Research (September 29, 2011). Available at 
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/09/mexico-high-courtallowsstateantiabortionamendment.php; 
Congress of the Republic, Political Constitution of PERU, Art. 2 (2006). Available at 
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/_ingles/CONSTITUTION_29_08_08.pdf; J. P. Enrile, An Act to 
Uphold the Human Rights and Promote the Welfare of the Unborn Child, Amending for the 
Purpose Articles 256, 257, 258, and 259 of the Revised Penal Code, and for Other Purposes; 
(MANILA, Senate), 2010. Available at http://alfi.org.ph/2011/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/3eSB2497-Protection-of-the-Unborn-child-Ponce-Enrile.pdf; R.Wicker, 
S91 Life at conception act. Washington, DC, United States Senate (2011). Available at 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-s91/text.  
52 For France, see Eva Steiner, “Surrogacy Agreements in French Law”, The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 41, n. 4, 866-875 (1992). Contracts against ordre public are null 
(nullité absolue). According to the Cour de Cassation, in the Alma Mater case the Cour said: "ces 
conventions [i.e. surrogacy arrangements] contreviennent au principe d'ordre public de 
l'indisponibilité de l'état des personnes". In the adoption case it said: "la convention par laquelle 
une femme s'engage, fut-ce titre gratuit, i concevoir et i porter un enfant pour l'abandonner i sa 
naissance contrevient tant au principe d'ordre public de l'indisponibilit6 du corps humain qu'i celui 
de l'indisponibilité de l'état des personnes”. 
U.K. see Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Law of Contract, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 16th 
ed.: 2012), 460. “Contracts against public policy are not illegal, in the sense that a contract to do a 
prohibited or immoral act is illegal. They are not ‘unenforceable’, in the sense that a contract within 
the Statute of Frauds in unenforceable for want of writing. These covenants lie somewhere in 
between. They are invalid and unenforceable”.  
53 Jessica H. Schultz, “Development of Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal 
Status of a Feto or Embryo?”, Chicago-Kent Law Review 84 (2010). 
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the rules used for frozen embryo cases54, enforcing prior agreements between the parties, that in this 
case is the agreement about the need for a mutual consent. In such a sphere, the dominant 
framework recognises the personal autonomy central role and turns on the intent of the parties; 
“[n]ot surprisingly, this emphasis on individual choice places a "virtual veto power" in the hands  
who want to avoid reproduction”55 However, it has to be noticed that, regarding enforceability, 
artificial womb disputes are different from the IVF one: if a court does not enforce an artificial 
womb contract, the court is choosing to let a potential life to grow; otherwise, if the court enforces 
an artificial womb contract, the court is actually preventing a developing life from continuing.  
- Contract between intentional parents and the service provider  
An ectogenesis scenario involves someone (a couple or a single person) who wants to have a baby 
and a clinic, which performs the artificial womb technique. To resolve any conflict between these 
two parties, the key is – again – a contract, but which one? There are many options such as service 
contracts, at-will employment ones, adoption ones and sale of goods ones; but not all of these 
frameworks are appropriate in such agreements.  
Firstly, we will focus on the at-will employment contract. The clinic may be considered an 
employee because it is hired to provide the gestation through the artificial womb to the intended 
parents, such as a day labourer provide his physical labour to the employer. However, this kind of 
contract is characterized by the fact that both the employer and the employee can terminate their 
working relationship whenever and for whatever reason. This factor makes an at-will employment 
contract inappropriate for an artificial womb contract: neither the intended parents nor the clinic can 
terminate their relationship at will. 
Secondly, it is impossible to imagine an adoption. Intended parents provide their gametes to a clinic 
that gestate the embryo in an artificial womb. It would sound hysterical to consider the clinic as the 
natural mother of the child, and it would seem simply crazy to consider so an artificial womb, that 
is a machine. Just notice that even for surrogacy contracts, the adoption contract has been 
considered inappropriate, because of the lack of genetic ties56. 
Thirdly, according to the US Uniform Commercial Code, the definition of “goods” includes “the 
unborn young of animals and growing corps”57. Even tough this provision seems to allow the sale 
of a human embryo or fetus as a good, it has to be noticed that these are not a res. Many courts58 
held that embryos and fetuses are neither a person nor a property, they have to be considered as a 
tertium genus between res and persona. For this reason, the goods contract model is inadequate. 
Finally, service contract refers to an agreement between the independent contractor and the 
employer: the first party agrees to supply time, effort and expertise in exchange for compensation. 
As an example, consider the contract between parents and a childcare provider running a day-care 
centre: he/she is paid for taking care of the children.59 As the same, the clinic (herein after, the 
‘service provider’) assume the duty to take care of the embryo inside the artificial womb. The 
service provider receives a compensation for developing the embryo and then the fetus. In a 
scenario in which there is more than one provider, probably, still paying the mere rent of the 
machine, intended parents can safely remove the artificial womb from the provider and turn to 
another one. About surrogacy in California, Berys argue that usually service providers’ activities 
are “regulated by state law that dictates the level of care to be taken. In contrast, because gestational 
                                                     
54 See the leading case Davis v. Davis 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
55 Olivia Lin, “Rehabilitating Bioethics: Recontextualizing in vitro Fertilization Outside Contractual 
Autonomy”, Duke Law Journal 54(2004), 485-500 
56 See e.g. Jonson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993),  
57 U.C.C. §2-105 (1998) 
58 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (US) and Constitutional Court, judgment 27/1975 (Italy). 
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surrogacy has not yet been written into legislation, there is no official standard established for the 
level of care to be exercised when gestating a fetus for another person” 60. This argument is 
unconvincing for ectogenesis. Artificial womb contracts are related to a futuristic technology, so, 
once it comes true, the legislator may reasonably rule it in detail. Then, she points out that service 
contract does not fit for surrogacy because “the surrogate is not only providing the service of 
physical care for the baby, but she is also earning her fee by handing the child over after its birth. In 
comparison, in a service contract, the fee is directly tied to the service itself, and not necessarily to 
the status of a product or good”61. Moreover, Anderson draws attention to the fact that “commercial 
surrogate contracts objectionably commodify children because they regard parental rights over 
children, not as trusts, to be allocated in the best interests of the child, but as like property rights, to 
be allocated at the will of the parents.”62. Mutatis mutandis, these reasonings are relevant also for 
the ectogenesis sphere. First of all, Anderson’s argumentation is based on a childbirth-centric 
conception of motherhood. According to her, the surrogate has parental rights on the baby because 
of the delivery. We argue that the surrogate is not a pregnant woman who, for various reasons, is 
seeking for adoptive parents for her baby. The surrogate is a woman that has accepted to gestate 
someone else’s baby, and naturally, the gestation itself culminate in the childbirth. Applying this 
approach to an artificial pregnancy would lead, ab absurdo, to recognize a corporative motherhood, 
for the provider, or an artificial one, for the machine. It is obvious that in such a scenario the mater 
semper certa est rule does not apply on a delivery basis: for this reason, parents are the ones who 
provide genetic materials. For this reason, the artificial womb contract does not include any transfer 
of the parental right, because intended parents are legal parents yet. The agreement is that is the 
service provider develop the commissioning couple’s embryo, they will pay a certain amount of 
money. In the end, the service contract seems to be appropriate for artificial-gestational agreements. 
 
III.b. for fetus or embryo 
Ectogenesis also imposes an analysis from the embryo and fetus’ point of view, rather than solely 
investigate the fully developed humans’ one, as we did so far. Unlike IVF embryos, the ones used 
for the ectogenic purpose are expected to develop. Indeed, IVF is a reproductive technology 
connected to conception, not gestation; so, if the embryo is not implanted in a uterus, it will 
naturally die within fourteen days. Embryos implanted in an artificial womb are instead supposed to 
fully develop without time limits. Moreover, if on the one hand IVF embryos in a petri dish are a 
mass of undifferentiated cells, on the other hand, in vitro fetus (here in after i.v. fetus)63 develops 
human organs, assuming a human shape. As already mentioned, ectogenesis raises legal, moral and 
ethical dilemmas: central to these dilemmas is the question as to what an i.v. fetus is. 
First of all, some terminological punctuations have to be done. We use the term “fetus”, rather than 
“embryo”, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) definition: “[f]etus means the product 
of conception from implantation until delivery”64. Even if the medical definition of fetus relates to 
the period of development from eight weeks to birth, the CFR’s definition highlights a relevant 
aspect: the fact that human embryos obtain different moral protection depending on whether they 
are implanted in a womb or not. In fact, if an embryo in a petri dish may be exposed to intrusive 
experiments, on the other hand, an in vivo one is generally not exposed to harmful research because 
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it is gestated in a living human body. According to Raskin and Mazor65, the fetus benefits from the 
mother full moral status, because the pregnant woman and the fetus are physically inseparable. 
Even if it is not medically accurate, the term ‘fetus’ gives the idea of the higher moral/legal status of 
the implanted embryo, contributing in a terminological way to stress out the difference between IVF 
embryos and i.v. fetuses. 
An i.v. fetus is different from any of the unborn entities we know. Thus, answering the ontological 
question about its nature is very important. Relatively to embryos and fetuses, the literature 
expressed three beliefs on this point: person, property and subjects entitled to special respect. 
According to the western legal tradition on this point, the fetus is not a person because of the 
differences linked to the early-life stage; nor a property, because they are not subject to property 
rights, e.g. it can not be alienated. The special respect view is the more persuasive because it 
enhances the fetus’ potential to become a person, but it also recognizes that the fetus is not a person 
yet.  
“The mere existence of an embryo in a womb adds value to its moral status”66, but what if the 
womb is an artificial one? If the fetus’ higher status depends on the fact that it is embedded within 
the carrier body, does the artificial nature of the artificial womb have any consequence on the IV 
fetus status?  The independent nature of gestation imposes to reflect on two main aspects: viability 
and birth. 
Many courts and several states legislatures use the concept of viability to describe the point of 
development of the fetus at which the fetus comes within the ambit of state interest, permitting the 
state to regulate and even ban abortion. The fetus becomes viable when it is “potentially able to live 
outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid”67. The IV fetus might be considered viable 
from the moment of implantation because since that moment the fetus lives outside the mother’s 
womb with artificial aid.  
This leads to many relevant implications, such as the one related to abortion. If the IV fetus is 
viable since the beginning, this means that it cannot be aborted at all. This not only contrasts with 
the right to privacy but also it evidently contrasts with the right to equal treatment. In this kind of 
scenario, women involved in a natural pregnancy have their rights to dignity and autonomy in 
decision-making respected, but, on the contrary, women who resort to artificial womb do not have 
the same treatment. 
Regarding birth, the traditional moment in which it occurs is marked by the act of departing the 
womb. In the case of i.v. fetuses, this definition would lead to some anomalous situations. Think at 
the case in which an extremely premature baby was born and, in order to save his or her life, he or 
she is put in an artificial womb, until the end of the pregnancy. When was the baby born: departing 
from the mother’s womb or from the artificial one? Is he or she born twice? 
Raskin and Mazor described a situation in which  
“a prematurely born neonate maintained on a life support system is considered born, whereas 
an in vitro fetus at the same stage of development and sustained in the same manner is not 
“born” yet. 
Does this mean that in terms of human subject research regulation the in vitro fetus should receive 
more protection due to the fact that it exists outside of a physical body, and thus “on its own” as a 
living human? Moreover, considering that the in vitro fetus is no longer protected by the natural 
shield of a female womb, it is further exposed to the scientific hunger for research than the in vivo 
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fetus. Does this make the in vitro fetus a distinct member of a much more vulnerable class of beings 
that require extended protection?”68 
In this regard, we argue that this inconsistency can be easily overcome considering the mother’s 
womb and the artificial one at the same level. In this way, the naturally gestated fetus and the i.v. 
one receives the same protection.  
Generally, both the viability and birth implications might find a solution considering a fetus a fetus, 
regardless of its nature and of its method of gestation. Equalizing the two kinds of wombs would 
inevitably lead to an equal moral value for fetuses so that they would be in the same category for 
the purpose of protection.  
4. Sex selection 
Mostly in the common thought, ectogenesis is usually linked to positive eugenics, understood as 
breeding the ‘best’ human traits to benefit future generations. The ability to externally observe the 
growing fetus and to actively control its development in various ways scares people: such a massive 
technical competence understandably might lead to fear a slippery slope mechanism.  
In this sense, one possible implication is linked to sex selection. In many parts of the word, parents 
demonstrate a gender bias, preferring sons69. In the July 2010 issue of the Atlantic “The End of 
Men”70, Hanna Rosin highlighted girl preference emerged in relation to sex-selection practices 
performed in the US71. This paragraph is meant to hypothesise artificial womb’s implications in this 
area and their legal implications. 
As already mentioned, there are two categories of artificial womb use: 
a) ex vivo pregnancies: the embryo is conceived with IVF techniques and it is directly implanted 
into the artificial womb for the entire gestation; 
b) in utero pregnancies: the embryo starts the pregnancy as a natural one; then the partially 
developed fetus is extracted by a surgeon from the woman’s womb and it is inserted into an 
artificial womb for the rest of the gestation. 
In this scenario, methods od sex selection vary in the timing of the necessary intervention.  
“One of these methods (MicroSort) involves pre-conception selection of the sex of the sperm. 
A second method (pre-implantation genetic diagnosis; PGD) uses post-conception but the pre-
implantation selection of the embryo. Finally, several older methods (amniocentesis, 
chorionic villi sampling, ultrasound, or blood tests) use post-implantation screening and rely 
on abortion of an already well-established fetus”72.  
Because of the timing, techniques occurring before implantation (MicroSort and PGD) may only 
apply only to ex-vivo pregnancies, unlike the post-implantation ones that apply to both 
pregnancies. 
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Genetic screening technique, in the form of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), was 
developed for couples at risk of transmitting a genetic disease to their children. It was meant to 
detect specific genetic or chromosomal abnormalities, but PGD can be used to discover other 
genetical information, such as the sex of the unborn. PGD is used in conjunction with IVF, so to 
give the opportunity to perform a genetic screening of the embryo before it is implanted. If this 
technique would be used without any restriction, future parents could have access to a certain 
amount of genic information – also the sex of the unborn-baby– and they could decide to implant 
only embryos of their favourite sex.  
MicroSort allows pre-conception sex selection by sorting male from female sperm. Ejaculated 
sperm is sorted into predominately male or female sperm. The sperm of the desired sex is then used 
to inseminate the woman, avoiding in such way abortion and even elimination of embryos.  
Nowadays, “sex screening” is usually strictly ruled. It is allowed only to prevent genetic diseases in 
which sex has a relevant role. Opening to a PGD indiscriminate use, would lead to several questions 
such as: is it ethical to use PGD to discover the sex of the unborn baby and, because of this 
information, decide to continue the pregnancy or to abort? Is it sex selection part of women right to 
free choice and control over their reproduction?  
Thanks to the other methods previously mentioned, the sex of the unborn child will be discovered 
later in the pregnancy.  
“One method is a blood test that can determine the sex of the fetus after only five weeks of 
pregnancy. […] Amniocentesis is a well-established and accurate method to verify the sex of 
the fetus. Unfortunately, it must be performed beginning at week fifteen of pregnancy. […] A 
similar test, chorionic villi sampling, is done at ten to twelve weeks. Ultrasound scanning can 
also reveal the sex of the fetus and is a noninvasive method, but it is not one hundred percent 
reliable”73. 
In all these cases, if the detected sex is the undesired one, abortion is the only option. According to 
the international trend, normally, Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy is allowed within the 10th 
week. These techniques arise new problems concerning the best standard to perform an abortion for 
artificial womb. 
Without getting bogged down in the details of every method, it has to be noticed that there is two 
kind of sex selections: sex selection for medical reasons, aimed to avoid genetic diseases; and 
elective sex selection, aimed to have a child of a specific gender without medical reasons.  
Elective sex-selection techniques involve ethical, cultural and legal dilemmas. First of all, this kind 
of approach indirectly legitimises a gender-based discrimination. As they say these days, white-
western-straight-men are more likely to be taken on for managerial roles and have higher incomes. 
Not expressing a preference for a specific biological sex, but letting future parents free to decide, 
the legitimization of these techniques would be formally neutral; but in such a scenario it is obvious 
which sex would be the chosen one. Because of that, permission of elective sex selection legitimises 
the preference and the liked discrimination according to which it is better to have a baby boy, rather 
than a girl.  
Last, but not least, to elective gender selection is linked the slippery slope fear. A U.K. -based 
bioethics group, Human Genetics Alert, writes: "If we allow sex selection it will be impossible to 
oppose 'choice' of any other characteristics, such as appearance, height, intelligence, et cetera”74. 
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The shadow of past atrocities75 is still influencing our approach to procreative research and 
technique. Can the law forget them? 
 
Conclusion 
Because of its nature, the artificial womb is a controversial topic. It involves birth, death, 
parenthood, family, sex and freedom. It involves many aspects of human beings’ identity, it 
contests those cultural archetypes which define primary interpersonal relationships (sexual, 
emotional and family ones) and it moves deep structures of our personal nature.  
The uncontrollable quickness of scientific discoveries brought to a cultural shock. It was the shock 
“of individuals facing the possibility of making choices about their own existence and the shock of 
societies facing newly broadened horizons. It was a shock to political frameworks, which had to 
deal with ethical dilemmas and with the uncontrollable quickness of new scientific discoveries. 
Finally, it was a shock to lawyers because scientific progress changed the basis of their toolkits”76.  
In such a scenario, the need of rules emerges. Embracing ethical pluralism, the law will be 
responsible for encouraging or restraining scientific technology.  
Following the biolaw approach, this paper stressed out the artificial womb’s fundamental role in 
overcoming biological gender inequalities. If ectogenesis becomes reality, it would contribute to the 
debate over fetuses, such as its moral status and the parenthood rights over an i.v. fetus. Moreover, 
the contractual regulation would lead to new questions about these agreements limits and the in 
utero viability.  
Law appears to be at a crossroad: on the one hand, because of the fear of betraying nature, the 
contrast to the new paradigm; on the other, embracing and actively managing the change, so to 
avoid injustices during the transitional period.  If the law approaches ectogenesis with the aim of 
maximising the social good, maintaining the health and preventing sufferings, as Daedalus, it will 
hit the target.   
It is important the technological progress be aimed at providing an improvement to people’s life. In 
the given case it is also important to consider all the issues including philosophical, medical and 
bioethical ones, also good and bad sides of it, so to speak.  Following considering these issues 
development and implementation of the appropriate domestic legislation must be provided by every 
country for issues discussed in the paper not to be in a legal vacuum.   
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